Sunday, August 19, 2007

Emotional IQ just as important as brainpower for Buffett

Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with a 130 IQ," he says. "Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing."

Full article

A Shout-Out on the Web

Investing groupies make Facebook pages a virtual Omaha


Warren Buffett has never been known for his love of technology. In The Warren Buffett Way, Robert Hagstrom describes how limited the 76-year-old executive's online activities are: "He buys books, reads the Wall Street Journal, and plays bridge."

But while Buffett has pretty much ignored the Internet, the Internet has certainly not ignored him. Scads of investing sites, forums, and blogs around the globe lionize Buffett's legendary investing prowess and the success of Berkshire Hathaway, the investment holding company he runs. Members of online communities like Silicon Investor, with its Buffett-loving constituency, pore over his shareholder letters, discuss Berkshire's numbers, and scrutinize the latest transactions.

more

Saturday, August 18, 2007

Warren Buffett's Amazing Record

If you have invested $1000 with Warren Buffett in 1956 (about $7700 in 2007 dollars) and never cashed in, you'd have amassed $27.6 million at the end of 2006.

See detail

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Carlos Slim is the richest man you've never heard of

MEXICO CITY - Carlos Slim Helú's business career began on the playground, trading baseball cards.

He would buy the adhesive-backed paper cards at a candy stand in downtown Mexico City, then make a meticulous record of each trade in a ledger notebook, carefully evaluating whether he had come out on top in deals with his peers.

By age 12, he had moved on to trading stocks and bonds. Before turning 30, he owned a soft-drink company and a stock brokerage. Now, at 67, Slim is the world's second-richest man and is closing quickly on Bill Gates, according to Forbes magazine's most recent rankings. Slim's business empire stretches from Mexico to the United States - it includes major stakes in companies such as CompUSA and Saks Fifth Avenue - yet most Americans have never heard of him.

lim accumulated his $53.1 billion fortune by collecting companies in much the same way he did baseball cards. He searches for businesses that are undervalued, infuses them with cash and uses the size of his holdings to overwhelm the competition. He now owns stakes in more than 220 businesses but says he has never forgotten the lessons of his youth.

Full article

Sunday, August 12, 2007

Thursday, August 9, 2007

The Person Responsible For Your Success

By Jack Canfield

It's time to meet the person who has been responsible for the life you live right now.

This person has created your income, your debt, your relationships, your health, your fitness level, your weight, your attitudes and your behaviors. Who is it? To introduce yourself, just walk to the closest mirror and say hello! This person is you!

Although one of the popular myths out there is that "external factors" determine how you live, the truth of the matter is that you are in complete control of the quality of your life.

It's time to look at the life you've created and determine what is working and what is not. Certainly there are wonderful things happening in your life, whether it's your job, your spouse, your grades, your children, your friends, or your income level.

Congratulate yourself on these successes; you are creating them for yourself! And then take a look at what isn't working out so well. What are you doing or not doing to create those experiences?

It's time to stop blaming outside factors for your unhappiness.

When you realize that you create your experiences, you'll realize that you can un-create them and create new experiences whenever you want. But you must take responsibility for your happiness and your unhappiness, your successes and your failures, your good times and your bad times. When you stop blaming, you can take that energy and redirect to focus on creating a better situation for yourself. Blaming only ties up your energy.

It's also time to stop complaining.

Look at what you are complaining about. Really examine it. More than likely it is something that you can do something about.

Are you unhappy about something that is happening? Make requests that will make it more desirable to you, or take the steps to change it yourself. Making a change might be uncomfortable to you. It might mean you have to put in more time, money, and effort. It might mean that someone gets upset about it. It might be difficult to change or leave a situation, but staying put is your choice so why continue to complain? Face the facts that you can either do something about it or not. It is your choice and you have responsibility for your choices.

Successful people take 100% responsibility for the thoughts they think, the images that visualize and the actions they take.

They don't waste their time and energy blaming and complaining. They evaluate their experiences and decide if they need to change them or not. They face the uncomfortable and take risks in order to create the life they want to live.

Taking responsibility requires you to first decide to believe that you create all your experiences. Second, to pay attention to yourself, your behavior, and your life experiences. And last, to face the truth and deal with what is not working in your life. You have to be willing to change your behavior if you want a different outcome. You have to be willing to take the risks necessary to get what you want.

Isn't it a great relief to know that you can make your life what you want it to be? Isn't it wonderful that your successes do not depend on someone else?

Commit to taking 100% responsibility for your every aspect of your life. Decide to make changes, one step at a time. Once you start the process you'll discover it is much easier to get what you want by taking control of your thoughts, your visualizations, and your actions!

© 2007 Jack Canfield

Monday, August 6, 2007

A Primer on PE Ratios

By Sanjay Bakshi

The PE ratio is the most common tool used by investors and financial analysts to ascertain how expensive or how cheap a stock is. Unfortunately, it is also one of the most misunderstood tools in the investment business. A stock which may be having a PE of 5 may be thought to be cheap and yet it may turn out to be quite an expensive mistake. Similarly, a stock which may be having a PE of 100 may thought to be too expensive may actually turn out to be a bargain.

What are the determinants of a stock's PE ratio? There are eight. These are: (1) Stability; (2) Growth; (3) Dividends; (4) Return on invested capital; (5) Leverage; (6) The proportion of non-operating assets in a company's asset base; (7) Financial community's appraisal about the industry and the company, including its managers; and (8) Interest Rates.

Full article

Quote of the day

The most you get is what you ask for. - Dr. Phil

Sunday, August 5, 2007

Forex Investment Co: China De-pricing Countdown

The Yale Endowment

永远走在趋势前面

Fabio M. Cannavaro
Senior Financial Analyst

Conclusion: In the past five years, while Chinese products have taken over world consumer markets, the return of China’s trade surplus into world financial markets has re-priced all financial assets by flattening the yield curve, in my view. Growing risk appetite in China’s mounting multi-trillion-dollar foreign exchange reserve will spawn the world’s single-largest risky-assets investor in 2007. In my view, this will eventually raise the cost of money both inside and outside China and de-price all world assets. The “China surplus effect” on world asset prices will reverse.

What's New: Following the first proposal at China’s Third Annual Finance Working Conference in January, PBoC officials confirmed in March 2007 that a national forex investment company (for now, we’ll call it CFIC, or China Forex Investment Company, until the Chinese government gives it an official name) is in preparation and should be established in 2007. Initial seed capital should be around US$200 billion. We estimate that the initial net inflow of capital into this company will be around US$100 billion per annum, although the long-term inflow could go well beyond US$200 billion.

Implications: CFIC will change the cost of capital both inside and outside China, I believe. Through its most likely means of raising funds – i.e., issuing renminbi bonds and purchasing forex assets from the PBoC – CFIC will lock up excess onshore liquidity at the same time. Outside the country, by redirecting China’s current large appetite for US TBs into other asset classes, CFIC will steepen the yield curve in the US market. Thus, asset de-pricing in both onshore and offshore markets should follow. However, I believe CFIC is pricingpositive for risky asset classes (mainly equities) in the following industries, where China needs a long-term stake to serve its strategic goal to hedge domestic growth risks and secure the country’s long-term growth potential: 1) energy and materials; 2) financial services and 3) practical technology. “Financial protectionism” is likely to rise to build new barriers around China.

It’s a capitalists’ world, and China will take the game to the next level. The scale of the world’s largest risky-assets investor-in-the making is simply too significant be evaluated in the conventional way. CFIC is pricing-negative to all assets priced against the cost of capital, in my view.

Through its most likely means of raising funds – i.e., by issuing renminbi bonds and purchasing forex assets from the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) – CFIC will lockup excess onshore liquidity at the same time. Outside the country, by redirecting China’s current large appetite for US treasury bills into other asset classes, CFIC is likely to steepen the yield curve in the US market. In other words, China’s foreign exchange (forex) investment company, expanding its asset size to a trillion dollars within the next five years (my estimate), is so significant in size that it will raise the Chinese risk-free rate by increasing the government treasury supply. It will, at the same time, raise the international market’s risk-free rate by decreasing new demand for treasury bills. The risk-free rate moves the cost of capital. A rising cost of capital means asset de-pricing.

This is exactly the reverse of the liquidity development driven by China’s quickly mounting trade surplus in the past five years. On the one hand, under the current forex management system, the central bank had to keep issuing Rmb in the domestic market to settle large trade surplus forex. On the other hand, it kept buying up offshore treasury bills for “reserve” purposes. The onshore money flood and the hunger for offshore treasury bills have depressed risk-free rates and inflated asset prices, in my view.

Diversification of China’s forex holdings should start with asset classes, not currency. I do not foresee China’s diversifying away from the US dollar, even in the mid-to-long term. Neither do I foresee CFIC’s buying offshore-listed Chinese companies, as the government already owns 48% of this market and there is no need to set up CFIC for that purpose alone.

Although it is hard to forecast what assets the CFIC will invest in and when it will start buying (Chinese officials have been extra discreet on this topic, given its potential impact on world financial markets), it is possible to analyze what China needs. In the long term, I believe, to serve its strategic goals to hedge domestic growth risks and to secure China’s long-term growth potential, the forex investment company should take major stakes in world class companies in the following industries: 1) energy and material; 2) financial services and 3) IT and capital goods with leading technology.

Why CFIC?

In my view, China has at least four good reasons to set up a foreign exchange investment company now. 1) It has enough forex assets for “reserve” purposes already. 2) It needs to diversify it forex assets as it is becoming “the market” for US treasury bills. 3) There is not enough private demand to hold forex assets in China as the renminbi appreciates. 4) China can, at the same time, recycle excessive domestic liquidity caused by its current forex settlement scheme.

Two Sides of the “China Surplus Effect”

I think China’s skyrocketing trade surplus has made a significant impact on the world’s financial pricing mechanism, which I call the “China surplus effect.”

Inside China, under the current foreign exchange management mechanism, PBoC has to keep issuing currency to settle large sums of foreign exchange inflow from the trade surplus. Although PBoC has turned much more proactive in open-market operations and has kept raising the required reserve ratio (RRR) to lock up more liquidity, the overall net supply of liquidity in the domestic market has been excessive in the past few years, when China’s exports rose dramatically. The result is a negative real interest rate and asset price inflation.

In the offshore market, under the old policy deeming all foreign exchange as “reserves” for the country, China kept parking its quickly growing dollar pile in offshore-issued treasury bills (TBs), mainly in the US. Unfortunately, while the nation has never disappointed the world in producing as many Chinese-made products as needed, the world cannot supply as many financial assets as China needs at the same time. The net issuance of TBs in the world simply could not catch up with the speed at which China increased its trade surplus. This theory has been well explored by our currency economist. Although Steve did not point this out specifically, China clearly is the most important demand driver of the world’s low-risk financial assets.

The result has been the depression of long-term yields (or the flattening of the yield curve) and asset bubbles. Sovereign debt prices, represented by US TBs – the safest financial asset in the world – have surged, in turn depressing the risk-free rate. At the same time, the price of all risky assets has surged because of the low risk-free rate, on which their prices are built.

Forex Investment vs. Forex Reserve: More Risk Appetite

Although China may not reduce its core dollar asset holdings, mainly US treasury bills, the chance that China will maintain the same large appetite, even in the near term, is quite low, both practically and strategically. Although US TBs are the safest asset class in the world and serve the purpose of capital preservation well, theoretically, no assets are safe if one or two buyers represent the majority of the demand. On the other hand, China is facing unprecedented challenges in its growth model – such as energy safety, material sufficiency and financial stability. In recent years, hedging the country’s long-term growth risks has emerged as a higher priority than simply preserving capital.

Indeed, China’s progress on this subject has been fast. In January 2007, at the country’s Third Finance Working Conference, the proposal was made to set up a national foreign exchange reserve investment company to invest in riskier asset classes. In March 2007, during the annual National People’s Congress season, PBoC officials confirmed that the forex investment company was in preparation and should be established in 2007.

CFIC Can Reshape the Yield Curve

As disclosed by a few reputable domestic financial media, including the official Shanghai Securities News, initial seed capital of the national forex investment company is US$200 billion (approximately China’s annual trade surplus in 2007). I personally expect that this entity will receive some US$100 billion capital inflow in the following few years (i.e., approximately half of China’s annual trade surplus). Our chief currency economist, Stephen Jen, with his extensive expertise in global forex strategies, forecasts that transfers out of China’s forex reserves into this investment fund will eventually be much larger than US$100 billion a year, probably close to US$250 billion a year. Buying more US TBs simply does not help China, we think.

I believe that a large portion of China’s current appetite for US TBs will be redirected to other asset classes with the up-and-running of CFIC. China’s current massive craving for US TBs is unlikely to be maintained. In the mid- to long term, I expect a reversal of what we have seen in the past few years – i.e., the steepening of the US yield curve and the rise of the risk-free rate. The result would be the “de-pricing” of all assets. This may not happen quickly, considering that China itself is a major dollar asset holder, but I believe this has to be the long-term trend.

CFIC Can Lock up Domestic Excessive Liquidity

PBoC cannot simply “transfer” the forex assets on its balance sheet to CFIC. It is unlikely that the Chinese Central Bank will put a significant portion of its assets with a commercial fund management company to invest in risky asset classes. It is also unlikely, in my view, that CFIC will “borrow” US$200 billion forex assets from the PBoC, by such means as issuing dollar bonds to the PBoC, because this would not change the forex asset size on the Central Bank’s balance sheet.

The most likely way of funding CFIC, in my view, is to issue renminbi-denominated government bonds to the public and “swap” forex assets with the PBoC. The Central Bank does not take any risk in this scenario, and its forex assets size is reduced.

It is clear that such a method of funding the CFIC would recycle liquidity in the domestic market – which is probably preferred be the central bankers, who have been busy raising interest rates and required reserve ratio (RRR) since the beginning of 2007, anyway.

If the CFIC were to fund all of its US$200 billion seed capital by issuing Rmb bonds, it would lock up approximately Rmb1.5 trillion of liquidity, equivalent to raising the commercial banks’ RRR by 4.5%! It is impossible for China to lock up so much liquidity in one shot. The CFIC will most likely issue bonds in different batches, in my view.

Asset Allocation: a Theoretical Study

Despite extensive media speculation, I do not think that CFIC will buy offshore Chinese companies’ stakes as its core asset holdings. First of all, the Chinese government already owns 48% of the Hong Kong listed H-shares and Red Chips. Further increasing the government’s stake is clearly not necessary and probably does not make commercial sense. Second, even if China wants to invest in offshore-listed domestic companies, there is no need to set up a forex investment company for this purpose – the current Huijin Company (the government’s domestic investment company) already has this function (it currently owns about 45% of four Chinese commercial banks listed offshore).

I do not think that China will diversify aggressively away from US dollar assets either. Our chief currency economist, Stephen Jen, concurs with this view. In our opinion, the diversification should be around asset classes, not currency, at least in the near to mid-term. Outbound investments in the US, Europe and emerging markets are the core holdings of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) – one of the most successful forex investment companies. Most of GIC’s investments are in risky assets as well – 50% in equities and 20% in private equities, hedge funds, real estate and commodities.

Considering that CFIC will assume the “investment” function, while the “reserve” function will remain with the PBoC, a likely asset allocation outcome for the CFIC should be around the US dollar and other mainstream currencies, in risky assets, most likely in equities and corporate bonds.

CFIC differs from Singapore GIC in the sense that it is too big to pursue superior returns with the whole world watching carefully its every little move. Although China’s official tone is that the purpose of such a forex investment company is to pursue higher returns by taking more risks, I believe its greater priority is to hedge China’s long-term growth risks. The primary focus of the forex investment company should be “diversification” rather than “return,” at least in the near- to mid-term.

What China Needs

A more interesting part of this study is to forecast where China will invest. Envisioning China’s building a trillion-dollars of extra demand for risky assets in the next five years (assuming that the forex investment fund has US$200 billion seed capital with US$100 billion capital inflow in the next two years and US$200 billion in the three years after) is enough to encourage speculation on China’s next move.

Although I think it is almost impossible to guess what specifically China will buy in the near term – considering the sensitive nature of the subject and the extra prudence of officials on such discussions to prevent front-running, it is possible to analyze what China needs to buy in the long term. I think China has three major risks to its current growth model and that there are three things it needs to buy aggressively to hedge its growth risk.

1) Energy and materials. China’s current “world factory” growth model is energy- and material-intensive. Although many industries in which China engages are “labor intensive,” I have not seen a single, real, labor-intensive plant in China in financial terms, because labor cost rarely goes beyond 30% of a typical Chinese factory’s costs in China, given that labor is so cheap. The real bottleneck in China’s “labor-intensive” growth model is energy and materials, not labor. It makes a lot of sense to me that CFIC takes strategic equity stakes in major multinational corporations (MNCs) in energy and materials industries. Although the Chinese government may not necessarily be able to influence the decision-making of these companies, at least this is a good way to hedge China’s financial downside when it meets an energy and materials bottleneck.

2) Financial services. The domestic financial sector’s volatility has driven three boom-bust cycles in the past 20 years in China. Even today, commercial banks monopolize more than 70% of the country’s corporate loan business, and China does not have a domestic yield curve, due to the irrelevant size of its corporate bond market. In other words, credit officers, not the financial market, price the credit risk in China. China is the world’s fourth-largest economy with an outdated financial system. Although financial reform is speeding up, it is not risk free. CFIC should take strategic stakes in the world’s leading commercial and investment banks to hedge this risk. Large multinational financial institutions can also serve as China’s best proxy to participate in growth opportunities worldwide.

3) Practical technology. “Industrial upgrade” is a term frequently used by Chinese officials these days. The application of practical technology to upgrade China’s current low value-added business model requires capital, and most companies in private sectors cannot afford it. An outside-the-box but practical idea would be for CFIC to take control of companies with such practical technology and reinvest the technology in Chinese companies. This should be quite a profitable business for both parties.

“Financial Protectionism”

At MacroVision 2007, the term “financial protectionism” was first used by our economists and strategists to describe barriers preventing emerging market companies from taking strategic stakes in companies in developed markets, such as the US. CNOOC’s failure to buy Unocal was a classic early example of such rising protectionism.

With the up-and-running of CFIC, financial protectionism will naturally gain an even greater audience among the right wings of the US, Europe and Japan.

However, just as trade protectionism never really reversed globalization, financial protectionism, at best, will serve as a disruption to “financial globalization,” in my view. At the end of the day, China did not reinvent the wheel. It is playing the capitalists’game.

Chinese Stock Market Comment - Credit Suisse May 07

● A-shares, trading at 39x P/E, look stretched in valuation. But Chinese money has limited access to investment opportunities abroad and faces negative real interest rates at home. Productivity gains through structural changes are large, and earnings momentum is robust. We do not foresee an end to the bull market yet, given the excess liquidity and productivity gains.

● But Beijing is likely to take action to cool down the market soon, causing a short-term, possibly volatile, correction. Bank deposits are exiting for the stock market at unprecedented pace . most new investors have zero experience in equity investment. We expect more aggressive rate hikes, the introduction of tax measures, a sell-off of state shares, and tough comments from senior officials in the coming weeks.

● We argue that any sizeable market movements in China would have global implications. International investors may not lose money from the A-shares, but worries of weakened Chinese demand for commodities and machineries would likely surface. Statistics show a much stronger correlation between A-shares and global equity markets this year.

Valuation is stretched, but . . .

We agree that valuations of the A-shares are stretched, but refrain from calling it a bubble at this stage.

We argue that the Chinese stock market is in the process of monetizing China.s huge economic success and productivity gains over the past two and a half decades. The lack of RMB exchange rate movement has caused real exchange rate appreciation, including asset inflation. Further, huge structural changes have taken place in recent years, including WTO entry, banking system reform, capital market reform, and a corporate tax cut. Each of them represents a major productivity gain to the economy. Last but not least, listed companies are reporting unprecedented strong earnings, which grew 130% year on year in Q1 2007. On a full-year basis, 2006 net profits have increased 44% YoY from the prior year, an acceleration from the 27% YoY growth in 2005.

Why a correction soon?

However, we still see a major correction in the near future. We sense that Beijing has become increasingly nervous about the increased level of speculation in the capital markets. Beijing so far has been taking a more tolerant stance toward the surging stock market, perhaps for the reasons we stated in the prior section. In addition, it needs to raise capital through the domestic equity market for banking system reform and establishing a pension system. However, the rapid exit of bank deposits for the stock market seems to make the leadership worried. China opened up its banking sector to foreign competition beginning last December. A strong deposit base is viewed as the biggest asset of the local banks against foreign banks, but outstanding residents deposits declined by RMB167.4 bn in April from the prior month.most likely this money entered the sizzling stock market. An even bigger worry is that the general public is jumping in without thinking much about the downside risk. In the case of a severe correction, this could lead to social instability. That, in our view, provides enough incentive for the leadership in Beijing to act quickly.

Central scenario

Our central case scenario is that the government will launch a coordinated campaign to curb stock market speculation. That possibly includes larger-than-expected interest rate hikes, probing misuse of bank loans for stock speculation, raising stamp duty on equity transactions, and other tax measures, and harsh comments from the official media and senior government officials. There is a strong likelihood that the government will release more state-controlled stakes in listed companies.

We expect to see an approximate 30% correction of share prices, with perhaps a temporary reversal of capital flows out of the stock market. We set out a relatively moderate and short-lived correction as our central case scenario because excess liquidity and negative real interest rates still persist in China, giving a fundamental reason for deposits to be shifted out into other higher-yielding assets. Also, we think the government would soon send out positive messages to prevent the correction from being overdone.

A global event now

To mainstream global investors, China is no longer an exotic emerging market, in our view. When China announced its robust Q107 GDP and CPI inflation results on April 19, the global markets moved in fear of economic overheating and a re-launch of austerity measures. We believe any significant correction in the Chinese stock market would prompt newsflow about a triggering effect on domestic demand, which in turn could cause slower import demand in commodities and machineries.

Saturday, August 4, 2007

Olbermann: Interview with Hillary Clinton

Sit down interview with Hillary Clinton.

Part I

Part II

Part III

More clips about Hillary Clinton, click here.

Friday, August 3, 2007

Lessons Learned From Selling My Used Car

by thickenmywallet

I am pleased to report that I sold my used car this weekend. I attribute this in no way, shape or form to my selling ability but to the fact my car (a Mazda hatch-back) is one of the leading selling sub-compacts in North America. Having never sold a used car before, this has been quite a learning experience for me and the ultimate do it yourself process. I wanted to share some of the costs of selling the car and the do’s and don’ts of selling a used car that I learned the hard way.

Click here for full story.

Thursday, August 2, 2007

Quote of the day

"You have to believe in yourself when no one
else does. That's what makes you a winner."
- Venus Williams

Wednesday, August 1, 2007

An interesting article to share with you regarding the coming long weekend.

A Holiday with History
On Simcoe Day it's your civic duty to have fun
by Chris Carter


Most of us are thrilled that halfway between Canada Day and Labour Day we get another long weekend -- a day off with the rather Soviet-sounding label "Civic Holiday."

But those Ontarians who love to hate Toronto may not want to hear that they have T.O. to thank for the August long weekend. And if you live here in the centre of the universe, you may not realize that we alone call it something else: Simcoe Day, in honour of the first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada.

John Graves Simcoe was more than just a colonial governor -- he abolished slavery, created Yonge Street, and even inspired the agricultural fair tradition that would give rise to the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair.

In 1869 Toronto City Council came up with the idea for a summer "day of recreation." In 1875, it was settled: the first Monday in August would be the official Civic Holiday.

That name stuck as other cities followed Toronto's leisure-loving example and proclaimed this a municipal (rather than provincial) holiday. But in 1968 Toronto City Council again took the lead and renamed the day to recognize one of Ontario's earliest historical figures.

Simcoe was a British soldier who distinguished himself during the American Revolutionary War, earning an appointment in 1777 to lead the elite Queen's Rangers regiment. In 1781 he returned to England, where he was later elected to the House of Commons. When the province of Upper Canada was created in 1791, Simcoe was named its first Lieutenant-Governor. He arrived in 1792 and established the provincial capital in Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake). But before long, the threat of invading Americans had him looking for a more secure capital, which he found in the harbour near the abandoned French fort of Toronto. Simcoe himself sailed into Toronto harbour in May 1793, and immediately wrote of his intention to establish an arsenal and name the place York. (York became the official name several weeks later to mark the Duke of York's victory over the French at Flanders.) The traditional name Toronto was restored in the 1830s.

Simcoe's historical influence extends beyond Toronto; Simcoe County was established in 1798, recognizing his exploration of the region. The town of Simcoe, which grew around a mill granted by Simcoe, was named in his honour in 1829.

So why then is Toronto the only city to declare Simcoe Day? Some MPPs have asked the same question, and have tabled private member's bills to have Simcoe Day declared province-wide, to no avail.

No, for now, John Graves Simcoe is ours, aristocratic leanings and all -- at least for the long weekend.